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The aim of this paper is to provide a critical survey of patent systems during the first phase of  
the industrialization process with a special focus on the British case. Perhaps surprisingly, no 
consensus  has  been  reached  yet  as  to  whether  the  emergence  of  modern  patent  systems 
exerted a  favourable  impact on  inventive activities  in this  historical phase. However, the 
recent  literature  has  shed  light  on  a  number  of  fundamental  factors  affecting  the  links 
between  inventive  activities  and  the  patent  system.  The  concluding  section  of  the  paper 















The importance of patents for economic development in general and for British industrialization in 
particular remains highly controversial.  According to Nobel laureate Douglass North, ‗by 
1700...England had begun to protect private property in knowledge with its patent law. The stage was 
now set for the industrial revolution.‘ (North & Thomas 1973: 155-6; also North 1981: 164-6). 
Dutton‘s study of the English patent system between 1750 and its reform in 1852 lends influential 
support to North‘s views (Dutton 1984: 202-5). Yet, Khan and Sokoloff‘s research suggests that 
North‘s argument may be more applicable to the United States than to England (Khan 2005; Khan and 
Sokoloff, 2001). Indeed, Khan and Sokoloff contend that deficiencies in its patent system were 
actively responsible for nineteenth-century Britain‘s relatively poor economic performance (Khan and 
Sokoloff 1998: 292-313). However, other scholars have been sceptical of any such direct, causal 
relationship between patents and industrialization. Ashton, for example, considered that, ‗It is at least 
possible that even without the patent system, discovery might have developed just as rapidly as it did‘ 
(Ashton 1948: 10; also Plant 1934; Landes 1969: 64; Mathias 1969: 34; MacLeod 1988; Greasley and 
Oxley 2007; and somewhat more ambiguously, Allen 2009). Over the past two decades, the 
emergence and development of patent systems has become a vital area of historical inquiry crossing 
economic, social, technological, industrial and intellectual history.  However, notwithstanding these 
renewed research efforts, historians such as Mokyr (2002: 295) notice that much remains to be done 
and ‘[the] exact relation [of patenting] to technological progress is still obscure‘.  
 
Moreover, the nature of the industrial revolution itself is a question that has taxed economic historians 
for nearly two centuries with little sign of imminent closure.  What exactly it was, when, where and 
how it occurred, and, of course, what caused it—such inter-related questions continue to fuel debate 
(MacLeod 2007: 136-44; Coleman 1992: 1-42; Cannadine 1984).  Crafts and Harley‘s analysis of the 
dynamics of productivity growth both at aggregate level and for the manufacturing sector probably 
represents the prevailing consensus on the pace and timing of economic change (Crafts and Harley, 
1992). Crafts and Harley‘s estimates suggest that the British economy grew more slowly before 1830 
than previously believed: there was no ‗take-off‘, no sharp upturn in economic growth in the late 
eighteenth century.  Instead, there was a gradual and slight acceleration during two or more centuries, 
which slowly took the Britain to a new plane of economic activity: until the 1830s, GDP was growing 
at less than 2% per annum; GDP per head of population, at considerably less than 1% per annum.  
Underlying this slow pace of economic growth was a relatively low rate of productivity growth in 
manufacturing, most of it concentrated in the cotton and iron industries. According to Crafts, ‗not 
only was the triumph of ingenuity slow to come to full fruition, but it also does not seem appropriate 
                                                 
1 This paper has been prepared as a report for the Strategic Advisory Board on Intellectual Property Policy 
(project on ―The Role and Rationale of Intellectual Property‖).   
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to regard innovativeness as pervasive‘ (Crafts 1985: 85; cf. McCloskey 1981 for an opposite 
viewpoint).  Furthermore, it has also been established that innovations took longer to diffuse than was 
once believed and the second half of the nineteenth century is now recognized as the period that 
witnessed the massive growth in steam power and in factory-based employment (von Tunzelmann, 
1978). And, while population grew continuously from the mid-eighteenth century, the standard of 
living only began to rise significantly from the 1850s (Musson 1976; Samuel 1977; Feinstein 1998).   
 
These reassessments of the contours of the British industrial revolution, in combination with the 
recent adoption of a global perspective that takes a broader geographical sweep and a longer 
chronological perspective (Pomeranz 2000; Inikori 2002, Allen, 2009), have the effect of reducing the 
prominence of that classic fifty to seventy year period, from 1760 or 1780 to 1830, which is now less 
and less easily packaged as ‗the Industrial Revolution‘ (Pollard 1981, MacLeod 2004).  Nonetheless, 
the term (its distinctiveness often downplayed by lower case initial letters) continues to provide a 
convenient short-hand to refer to the first epoch of industrialization that promoted Britain‘s rise to 
economic predominance—to its becoming during the mid-nineteenth century ‗the workshop of the 
world‘, the leading producer and exporter of manufactured goods.  
 
Technological change has been at the heart of many explanations of British industrialization (for 
example, Mantoux 1928, Ashton 1948, Landes 1969, McCloskey 1981, Berg 1994, Mokyr 2002, 
Allen 2009), even if some, seeking to avoid anachronism, now re-describe it as ‗useful knowledge‘ 
and suggest that the customary emphasis on mechanization should be reformulated to include a wider 
range of techniques, capabilities, skills and ‗know-how‘ (Mokyr, 2002). In Mokyr‘s succinct 
formulation: ‗The key to the Industrial Revolution was technology, and technology is knowledge‘ 
(Mokyr 2002: 29).   Moreover, whatever its initial role, it would be hard to deny that extensive 
technological change has been responsible for major increases in productivity during the past two 
centuries.   
 
The emphasis on the discontinuity in the processes of accumulation of technological knowledge 
leaves unresolved, however, the issue of which type of technological change.  For the Victorians, it 
was simple: Britain‘s rise to global economic predominance rested on the mechanization of the cotton 
industry, coupled to the power of the steam engine (Coleman 1992: 36-42; MacLeod 2007: 1-4, 136-
44).  It is no longer the case, however, that ‗whoever says industrial revolution, says cotton‘ 
(Hobsbawm 1962: 49-53).  Nor, in the wake of research into the pace of its diffusion, are we inclined 
to allow the stationary steam engine the starring role allotted it by the Victorians—certainly, not 
before the middle of the nineteenth century. Until then water-wheels continued to provide most 
mechanical power (Musson 1976, Von Tunzelmann 1978, Kanefsky 1979, Tann 1988, Crafts 2004).  
A less heroic view of the British industrial revolution has consistently proclaimed the importance of  
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coal, as part of a long-term shift to fossil fuels that constituted a fundamental transition from a finite 
organic economy, based on land, wood and water, to an economy liberated from the constraints of 
land by its exploitation of the mineral resources beneath it.  This interpretation of British 
industrialization as a gradual energy revolution that came to fruition in the mid-nineteenth century is 
not without its patents, but it has generally assumed a more incremental, more anonymous model of 
technological change (Nef 1932, Cipolla, 1962, Harris 1976, Flinn 1984, Thomas 1985, Wrigley 
1988, Allen 2009).  
 
Inevitably, these reassessments of the nature of the industrial revolution have also entailed a 
reconsideration of the role played by the patent system in such a process. These historiographical 
changes require that we examine the development of the English patent system over the longer term 
and in a wider, geographical and technological context.  For North, writing in the early 1970s, it was 
sufficient to point out the temporal proximity between the Statute of Monopolies and the classic take-
off period (1760-1830) of the industrial revolution, to put forward a post hoc, ergo propter hoc 
speculation about a causal link between the patent system and the industrial revolution. The ongoing 
reappraisals of the exact pace, timing and scope of economic change, instead, suggest that we need 
further research efforts aimed at providing more detailed assessments of the complicated relationships 
between patents, inventions and productivity in this historical phase. It is this most recent literature 
that we intend to survey here.   
  
First, we explore the antecedents, the medieval origins of European patent systems and the legislative 
foundation of England‘s in the Statute of Monopolies. Then, we analyse the long-term upward trend 
in patenting that begins in 1757 and coincides so neatly with the classic Industrial Revolution 
periodizations (Sullivan 1989), to enquire how far the patents may be taken as a proxy for inventive 
activity in this period.  This exercise reveals extensive innovation that was not covered by the patent 
statistics and leads to an examination of innovation achieved through ‗collective invention‘.
2  In 
section 5, we investigate the controversy sparked by the legislative reform of the UK patent system in 
1852 that almost resulted in its abolition; and in 6, the British case in international perspective. In 
section 7 we discuss the resurgence of the system, strengthened by further reforms between 1883 and 
1907 . Finally, we suggest that to understand the workings of the patent system it is helpful to think of 
it as a technology in its own right: as with all technologies, it was shaped by the circumstances of its 
invention and development. The UK‘s patent system was a product of a period during which property 
was being redefined as being subject to exclusively private ownership, and to this ‗intellectual 
property‘ was no exception.  Patents had as much to do with investing as with inventing, with 
capitalism as with creativity. The marks of the oligarchic polity that moulded the patent system during 
                                                 
2 By ‗invention‘ we understand an addition to knowledge in the technological domain; by ‗innovation‘, its first 
commercial adoption.      
 
5 
the eighteenth century persisted throughout the nineteenth. Despite statutory reforms in 1852 and 
1883, it remained expensive and barely fit for purpose, leaving much inventive activity unregistered 
in its (belatedly systematized) records.     
 
2. ANTECEDENTS 
The origins of Europe‘s patent systems may be traced to the occasional privileges issued by medieval 
rulers, principally to immigrant craftsmen who offered to introduce new manufactures or techniques 
in return for princely protection and other local benefits (May 2002, Long 1991). These grants 
conferred no monopoly but encouraged artisans to settle and transmit their knowledge and know-how 
to native apprentices.  The migration of skilled workers and engineers was the primary channel 
through which technology was transferred, both within and between countries (Davids 1995, Epstein 
1997). As local guilds battled to retain trade secrets exclusively for their members, privileges became 
weapons in the hands of rivals to lure ambitious or dissatisfied guildsmen and elicit their secrets. This 
cat-and-mouse game was particularly intense among the Italian city states (Belfanti 2004).   
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that Florence granted Europe‘s first exclusive patent in 1421, to the 
architect Brunelleschi for the barge and hoisting gear he would use on the Arno to transport marble 
for his famous dome. Nor that, in 1474, Venice was the first state to regularize by statute the award of 
monopoly patents: by registering an invention the patentee secured the sole benefit of its use for ten 
years, with a penalty of 100 ducats for infringement – except by the state which reserved its right to 
free use (May 2002: 13).  The bill‘s opening statement encapsulated the link between mobility and 
innovation: ‗Men with most acute minds able to conceive various ingenious devices reside in this City 
and, thanks to its greatness and tolerance, move here every day from different countries‘ (Biagioli 
2006: 148).  But artisans in search of advancement also emigrated from Venice, especially its highly 
skilled glassmakers, who disseminated knowledge of its patent system when they negotiated their 
settlement with other city states and Europe‘s rulers. ‗One way or another, Italian influence shows like 
a thread in all incipient patent systems‘ (Frumkin 1947: 52). 
 
In England, Elizabeth‘s chief minister, William Cecil (later Lord Burghley) revived the medieval 
practice of awarding royal privileges to foreign artisans as a major arm of policy, extending it to 
Englishmen who imported new manufactures or invented new products and processes previously 
unknown in the kingdom. With England still lagging behind its continental neighbours in many fields 
of technology, import substitution was at the centre of Cecil‘s schemes: grants stipulated that goods 
should be cheaper than their imported equivalent, there should be no delay in implementing the new 
manufacture, and English apprentices should receive a full training. Moreover, guilds and other 
established interests were consulted to avoid inflicting harm and provoking discord (MacLeod 1988: 
11-13). Results were mixed, however, Burghley lost heart, and gradually malpractices crept in.  
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Elizabeth and her successor, James I, found in the issue of licences a much-needed source of 
patronage and revenue.  Privileges could still be obtained for the introduction of foreign (and native) 
inventions, especially for those with influence at Court. But, more controversially, monopolies were 
increasingly granted where there was no innovation to courtiers and their clients, with harmful effects 
on both tradesmen and consumers (Duncan 1976: 99, 116-31, 147-73; Thirsk 1978: 86-7, 95-101). 
 
As a result, England came close to abolishing its nascent patent system a century and a half before the 
Industrial Revolution conventionally began. In 1623, with popular anger erupting against these 
misuses of the royal prerogative, parliament enacted the Statute of Monopolies (21 Jac.I c.3).  Its 
purpose to prevent further such abuse, the Statute specifically preserved the monopoly privileges 
granted to inventors and to importers of invention. Section 6 limited patents of invention to a 
fourteen-year term, to ‗new manufactures within this realm‘, and to their ‗true and first inventor‘, 
excluding anything illegal or deemed harmful to the state or the public interest; their validity could be 
tried at common law (MacLeod 1988: 14-19). For the next two and a quarter centuries, until the 
passage of the Patent Law Amendment Act of 1852, this clause of exemption provided the 
fundamental legislative basis of the English patent system.  
 
Charles I, even more desperate for revenue, contrived to ignore the Statute, with the result that the 
patent system was totally discredited and effectively dismantled by the Long Parliament in 1640 
(Yamomoto 2010: 60-3).  ‗Monopoly‘ had become a highly emotive word, and retains its pejorative 
force to this day. At the Restoration, the patent system was re-established under the watchful eye of 
public and parliament. While the later Stuarts often sailed close to the wind (courtiers and office-
holders received preferential treatment, and patents might be over-ridden by subsequent grants or 
disallowed because they jeopardized royal revenues), the regular fiscal exploitation of patents was not 
revived. On the other hand, there is no evidence of the use of the system as an industrial policy tool as 
in Burghley‘s period (MacLeod 1988: 20-39; Yamomoto 2010: 74-85). The routine administration of 
the English patent system was the epitome of laissez-faire. It registered the inventor‘s claim and took 
his money (lots of it), but left the question of his reward to the market and the business of regulating 
or enforcing the patent to the litigation of the civil courts (cf. Hilaire-Pérez 2000).   
 
3.1 THE ENGLISH PATENT SYSTEM, 1660-1852: DEVELOPMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 
Before 1852 there was no dedicated patent office, but only a tortuous route through the royal 
bureaucracy laid down by the Clerks Act (1535) for all grants of the crown under the great seal.  An 
applicant‘s petition for ‗letters patent‘ was referred to one of the crown‘s law officers (Attorney or 
Solicitor General), who was required to check that the patent would not contravene the Statute of 
Monopolies -- or harm the royal interest, for example, by reducing the revenue from excise duties.   
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There was no formal examination for novelty or utility, and very few applications were refused.
3  Yet, 
the applicant still had to negotiate a bureaucratic maze: his patent would not be enrolled until he had 
accumulated an expensive series of seals and signatures, waiting on officials, paying fees and favours 
at every stage (Gomme 1946: MacLeod 1988: 40-8).  This time-consuming process added to the cost, 
especially for anyone not resident in London.  One Manchester inventor‘s diary shows him spending 
six months there during 1722-3 (Gomme 1934-5: 210-16).   
To secure a patent for England and Wales cost approximately £100; to extend it to Scotland and 
Ireland, another £200--250 (plus more time and effort).  A patent agent‘s services, which the system‘s 
growing complexity (especially the specification) made increasingly desirable, added a further £40 to 
£100 (Dutton 1984: 86-96; Khan and Sokoloff 1988: 300). It was an enormous expense when a skilled 
worker earned about £1 to £2 per week.  Charles Dickens famously lampooned this bureaucratic 
excrescence in his ‗Poor Man‘s Tale of a Patent‘ and Little Dorrit.  The poor man afforded his patent 
only through that common Victorian literary device of a chance inheritance (MacLeod 2007: 184-6).  
And yet there remained the specification to be filed.  This requirement to provide a more detailed 
description of the invention (within two to six months of the patent‘s enrolment) was introduced ad 
hoc during the first third of the eighteenth century; from 1734 it became standard.  Although initially 
demanded to assist the law officers in discriminating among ostensibly similar inventions (possibly in 
case of a challenge before the Privy Council), the specification was not normally scrutinized by any 
administrative department of government.  As a result, many specifications remained extremely 
opaque (MacLeod 1988: 48-55).  It would be subjected to close judicial scrutiny, however, if the 
patentee prosecuted an infringement: where insufficiently full or accurate it threatened the patent‘s 
validity.  Indeed, the specification became the patent‘s most vulnerable aspect, but patentees hopeful 
of avoiding litigation might still prefer obfuscation. There remained much judicial uncertainty: while 
exactness risked allowing competitors to circumvent the patent via a minor variation, a too general a 
claim exposed the specification to a successful legal challenge (Adams & Averley 1986: 156-79). It 
was anxiety concerning the validity of his specification that notoriously deterred James Watt from 
immediately prosecuting some infringements of his patent for the separate condenser; fearful that his 
specification would be found insufficiently precise, for a long time he preferred not to risk losing his 
patent (Robinson 1971, Miller 2006).  Specification also added to the costs of patenting.  A 
specification that would withstand the test of both litigation and piratical cunning placed a premium 
on good draughtsmanship.  One leading engineer in 1851 put the cost of patenting ‗a complex 
                                                 
3 One of the very few examples of a patent that was refused the great seal of which we are aware is the curious 
patent for "a new invented medicine consisting of a liquid, which by washing the part, in men, any time within 
eight hours after coition absolutely prevents the communication of the venereal disease, let it be of any degree or 
virulence, whatsover" applied for by the chemist Samuel Hannay in 1774  
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machine, or system of machines‘ at £500-600, because of having to provide extended and complicated 
specifications ([House of Lords] 1851: 429).  
Prior to 1753, a patentee could appeal to the Privy Council for support in the enforcement of his 
rights: infringement was deemed tantamount to contempt of the royal prerogative.  The Privy Council 
had the option of referring a case to the civil jurisdiction of the common law courts; finally, prompted 
by an especially thorny case in 1752, it entirely ceded them its authority (Hulme 1917; MacLeod 
1988: 58-60).  Patentees now had no resort but to the expense and delay of the legal system.  The 
reluctance to prosecute engendered by these factors was exacerbated by the extreme uncertainty 
surrounding the law of patents.  What constituted a patentable ‗invention‘ under the Statute of 
Monopolies only began to be determined once the Privy Council relinquished its jurisdiction in the 
mid-eighteenth century, and the case law was slow to compensate for the vagueness of an outdated 
statute.   In 1795, Chief Justice Eyre, sitting in the case of Boulton and Watt vs Bull complained that 
‗patent rights are nowhere that I can find accurately described in our books‘ (Holdsworth 1922-72: 
XI, 425).  He was echoed three decades later, by a witness to parliament‘s first investigation since 
1623 into the patent system, who told the 1829 select committee that ‗there being no existing basis of 
law, the dictum of the judge is one thing one day and another thing another‘.  Or, in Marc Isambard 
Brunel‘s pithier phrase, ‗I might as well toss for the fate of a patent‘ ([Select Committee on Patents] 
1829: 454, 486).  
The imprecision and unpredictability of the law seems to have been exacerbated until the 1830s by a 
prejudice among judges and juries against patentees.  Dutton refers to ‗the excessively hostile attitude 
of some judges‘ who, perhaps unsurprisingly in the historical and legal context, were on their guard 
against the abuse of the monopoly privilege that a patent conferred.  They were regularly accused of 
interpreting the law in the strictest possible way, willing to cancel a patent for some trivial error of 
clerical copying (Dutton 1984: 77-8).  Dutton finds that between 1750 and 1829 only a third of 
judgements at common law went in favour of the patentee; in the 1830s and 40s this jumped to three-
quarters (76%), and judges themselves commented on the recent change in attitudes (Dutton 1984: 78-
9; MacLeod 2007: 69-81, 183-9).
4  
3.2 THE ENGLISH PATENT SYSTEM, 1660-1852: INTERPRETING THE STATISTICS 
After a century of stagnation in which the annual total of patents granted fluctuated between zero and 
23 but was normally in single figures, the 1760s saw the beginning of a new trend—a long-term 
increase from an annual average of 20 in that decade to over 60 in the 1790s, rising to more than 450 
                                                 
4 A more favourable picture is emerging from Sean Bottomley‘s research, which implies a more certain legal 
situation than Dutton and MacLeod suggest: ‗Patent disputes in the English law courts, 1753-1799‘, presented to 
ESTER Advanced Seminar, Eindhoven University of Technology, 23-26 June 2009.  
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in the 1840s (Mitchell and Deane 1962: 268-9; Sullivan 1989).
5  Does this reflect an upsurge in 
inventive activity?
6 Is it evidence for a stimulus to invention from the patent system?  Alternatively, is 
it indicative of nothing more than an increasing propensity to patent? Whether or not it represents a 
real surge in inventive activity is impossible to determine conclusively, but the argument for its 
reflecting some autonomous increase in the propensity to patent merits restatement, especially now 
that the chronology of the classic Industrial Revolution has been undermined by Crafts‘ and Harley‘s 
calculations (MacLeod 1988: 144-57). 
7 
Patenting an invention was by no means common or automatic. During this period the patent system 
was still an embryonic institution—indeed it was still in search of a specific role.  Although it was not 
subject to serious legislative interference between 1624 and 1852, it was highly plastic.  It emerged 
from the seventeenth century deeply scarred both by its association with monopolies and royal 
favouritism, and more recently by its implication in the stock-market bubble of the 1690s--a 
phenomenon repeated in 1717-20 (MacLeod 1986; Yamomoto 2010: 281-96, 346-7).   Few inventors 
other than those with connections to the Court or the City of London were likely to have been aware 
of its existence; or if aware, to have seen its relevance to their activities.   This began to change, but 
only slowly.  Developments in transport and communication during the eighteenth century promoted 
awareness of the patent system at the same time as they stimulated the growth of a national market in 
commodities and in factors of production.  In particular, faster coaching services and the regular 
publication of newspapers, journals, advertisements and other publicity materials carried news of 
patented inventions and patent litigation into the provinces.  The 1790s saw the launch of specialist 
journals, such as the Repertory of Arts and Manufactures, which listed patents and critiqued new 
inventions.  The broadening geographical distribution of patents is testimony to such an extension of 
awareness: it doubled from 19 counties where at least one patent was obtained in the 1750s to 38 
counties in the 1790s (MacLeod 1988: 77-8, 126-7).   
A positive feedback mechanism developed.  The more patents issued, the greater was both the 
public‘s awareness of them and the pressure to obtain them.  The patent system generated its own 
                                                 
5 Deflating the figures by population totals produces a much less impressive rate of increase before the 1830s 
(Khan and Sokoloff 1998: 299) 
6 Sullivan (1989,1990) has argued that the evidence of patent counts lends support to the traditional view of the 
industrial revolution, as they exhibit a sharp acceleration taking place across a broad industrial front around 
1760 and this finding contradicts the Crafts and Harley‘s account of a slow and relatively concentrated process 
of economic change. Nuvolari and Tartari (2010), on the basis of new estimates of the quality of  individual 
patents, have suggested a reconciliation between these viewpoints, arguing that, although, total patents were 
widespread, high quality patents emanated from a very restricted number of key-sectors.     
7 A recent analysis of the nature of the co-integration between the time series of patents and those of industrial 
output in various sectors for the period (1780-1851) performed by Greasley and Oxley (2007) reveals that the 
causality link run mostly from the dynamics of industrial output in a restrcted number of key-sectors (cotton, 
iron and mining) to the series of aggregate patents. In Greasley and Oxley's interpretation, this result suggests 
that the rise of patenting was a consequence and not a cause of the acceleration of industrial output growth. A 
similar view, positing that the acceleration of industrial output led to a growth in the demand of patenting, was 
originally sketched by Ashton (1948). See also MacLeod (1988, ch. 8).   
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defensive logic: inventors began to realise that neglecting to patent an invention might mean losing it 
to someone more pro-active, who would demand a royalty for its continued use or production.  Such 
anxieties appear in inventors‘ correspondence – informing, for example, the decisions of James Watt 
and his friends as they debated whether or not to incur the expense of a patent (Dutton 1984: 183-5; 
MacLeod 1988: 89-90).  
Other major trends increased the propensity to patent, not least the long-term restructuring of the 
economy, with its concomitant redirection of capital and labour from agriculture into the 
manufacturing and service sectors (Crafts 1985: 60-4).  The agrarian sector, which had dominated the 
pre-industrial economy, generated few patents: while still employing over a third of the workforce in 
1800, it accounted for less than 4 per cent of patents (MacLeod 1988: 97).  Consequently, as 
employment in manufacturing and services expanded both absolutely and relatively during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, so did the pool of inventors with a higher propensity to patent.  
Another important trend conducive to patenting was urbanization (MacLeod 1988: 125-9).
8  Since the 
vast majority of patentees were based in towns and cities, the growth of Britain‘s urban population (19 
per cent of total population in 1700, 23% in 1750, 35% in 1800, 54% in 1850, 75% in 1900) would 
independently stimulate the propensity to patent. 
Patentees clustered in those parts of the country and sectors of the economy that had moved furthest 
towards a hierarchical, competitive and capital-intensive economic structure. Throughout this period 
Londoners predominated: with approximately one tenth of England‘s population and one quarter of its 
manufacturing output, the capital city consistently obtained over half of all patents (Dutton 1984: 87-
8; MacLeod 1988: 118-25).  To some extent this reflects their proximity to the bureaucracy and 
greater awareness of the system, but it is also symptomatic of the increasingly capitalistic organisation 
of London‘s manufacturing sector, in particular its higher-status crafts.  A further quarter of English 
patents were taken out by residents of the manufacturing districts in the midlands and north—
especially the metalworkers of Birmingham, the textile manufacturers of Lancashire and Yorkshire, 
and the hosiers of Nottingham and its region (Dutton 1984: 88-9; MacLeod 1988: 124-34). 
In the second half of the eighteenth century the textile industries (including hosiery and lace) and the 
metalworking industries each accounted for approximately 14 per cent of English patents.  It was a 
period that saw major strides in the centralization and capitalization of these industries.  The domestic 
organization that typified most of the textile industries had not been conducive to patenting: 
manufacture‘s diffusion over a wide area, often in remote cottages, made enforcement very difficult 
(as John Kay discovered when he tried to collect royalties from Lancashire weavers using the flying 
shuttle).  The more centralized and highly capitalized sectors of the industry obtained more patents: 
                                                 
8 Sokoloff remarked the same phenomenon in the early USA, though he ascribed higher levels of patenting in 
urban centres to higher rates of inventive activity (Sokoloff 1988, Sokoloff and Khan, 1990).  
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the silk industry (with its early ‗throwing‘ factories) and the finishing processes in all sectors were 
predominant in the patent records before 1770.  Thereafter, the reorganization of cotton and worsted 
spinning into factories prompted an upsurge in their patenting.  Not only was a patent easier to police 
in a factory-based industry, but it was also potentially more valuable as these industries grew 
exponentially (MacLeod 1988: 102-3).  Khan and Sokoloff similarly emphasise the impetus from 
‗centralized plant organization . . . [to] more rapid technical change over time‘, and point to the 
greater prevalence of cottage manufacture in Britain as a major reason for its lower rate of 
productivity growth in comparison with the USA‘s (Khan and Sokoloff 1998: 307-8).  In the metal-
ware trades Birmingham, its manufacturing concentrated in fewer, richer, more competitive hands 
than its rivals‘, outpaced them all in obtaining patents -- 90 by 1800 (MacLeod 1988: 130; Berg 1991; 
Berg 1998). 
4.1. INVENTIVE ACTIVITY OUTSIDE THE PATENT SYSTEM 
Without a patent system, it is doubtful that eighteenth-century Britain would have seen significantly 
less inventive activity, since most inventors ignored it. Of course, detailed quantitative assessments of 
the amount of inventive activity undertaken outside the coverage of patent protection remain 
inherently speculative. The appeal of patents for economists and economic historians largely stems 
from the opportunity to study systematically the full universe of patented inventions. By contrast, any 
sensible catalogue of the inventions that remained unpatented is likely to be fraught by omissions and 
related biases, or restricted in long-term comparisons. Moser‘s (2005, 2010) research on the 
inventions presented at the Crystal Palace exhibition of 1851 probably provides the best quantitative 
snapshot of the large volume of inventive activity undertaken outside the patent system in the mid-
nineteenth century. None of the British or American industries she considers had patenting rates (i.e., 
the ratio between patented inventions and total inventions) higher than 50 per cent. The highest value 
she reports is 36.4 per cent for the US machinery industry.
9 
These aggregate results are supported by ‗micro-evidence‘ emerging from detailed histories of 
inventors, industries and specific technologies. Famous examples of unpatented inventions include 
Crompton‘s spinning mule, Trevithick‘s high-pressure steam engine, and Jenner‘s vaccination against 
smallpox.  At least two highly innovative manufacturers, Josiah Wedgwood and Jesse Ramsden, 
renounced patents subsequent to an early disillusionment (MacLeod 1988: 111; McConnell 2007).  
                                                 
9 Interestingly enough, Moser‘s findings are similar to those emerging in modern studies on the propensity to 
patent.  In these studies, patents are reckoned by R&D managers to be the most effective tool for appropriating 
economic returns from invention only in a few selected industries such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals. 
Instead in the majority of contexts, secrecy, lead times and the control of complementary assets are recognized  




Harrison‘s chronometer was famously invented in response to the Longitude Act of 1713,
10 and much 
inventive activity is captured in the records of institutions such as the Royal Society of London and 
the Society of Arts, which from 1754 offered premiums and prizes for invention (MacLeod 1988: 
193-5; Hilaire-Pérez 2000: 189-209; O‘Brien et al. 1996).
11 Furthermore, a large volume of inventions 
were of incremental nature, and consequently anonymous and detectable only by their effects.  
Although often overlooked in assessments of patenting, the crucial importance of (usually unpatented) 
incremental improvements is widely acknowledged in both histories of industrialization and modern 
empirical studies of innovation (Landes 1969, Mathias 1969, Rosenberg 1976, Von Tunzelmann 
1981).    
Technological change in major sectors of the economy raised productivity or offered consumers a 
widening range of goods, on a scale that was scarcely hinted at in the patent records.  A striking 
example of the former was the agricultural sector, with only 4 per cent of eighteenth-century patents. 
Yet, ‗between 1300 and 1800 the average yield of wheat rose from about 12 bushels per acre to about 
20 bushels‘; the output per acre of other crops realised similar or greater increases (Allen 2008: 182; 
Crafts 1985: 83-4).  This 66 per cent increase in yields was achieved principally after 1600, through 
the introduction of nitrogen-fixing crops in new rotations, which left hardly a trace in the patent 
records.
12 Also of importance in raising (both land and labour) productivity were improvements in 
drainage, manures, seeds, and implements (Allen 2008: 202; Wrigley 1985).  A small range of 
drainage devices and a few implements were patented, the latter mostly after 1780—a development 
stemming from the emergence of specialist manufacturers of agricultural implements—but their 
number was scarcely commensurate with the improvements in this sphere.   Similarly, the gains made 
through selective breeding of livestock went unpatented. These technical advances raised the 
productivity of both land and labour, releasing a growing proportion of the workforce into the 
industrial and service sectors (Bairoch 1973).   Where not anonymous, they were rewarded rarely with 
patents, more often with prizes from agricultural and improvement societies or sometimes they were 
protected by copyright in agrarian treatises (MacLeod 1988: 98, 193-5). 
                                                 
10 According to Boehm and Silberston (1967, pp. 25-26), between 1750 and 1825 there were at least eight Acts 
of Parliament instituting prizes for specific inventions. Furthermore, in several cases particularly deserving 
inventors were also compensated by Parliament by means ex-post rewards. 
11 Interestingly enough, at least in principle, the award system of the Society of Arts, was opposed to patents, as 
the ―Rules and Notices of the Society‖ stated explicitly that ―no person shall receive any premium, or bounty 
from the Society, for any matter for which he has obtained or proposes to obtain a patent‖ (Harrison, 2006, 
p.163). A recent study by Brunt et al (2008) of the prizes for invention awarded by the Royal Agricultural 
Society of England over the period 1839-1939 shows that prizes could be very effective stimuli for inventive 
activities. 
12 A major recent study by Olmstead and Rhode (2008, see in particular pp. 400-401) has also stressed the 
fundamental role of a streams of biological innovation in American agricultural development throughout the 
nineteenth century taking place long before the first form of formal legal protection (Plant Protection Act of 
1930).   
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The mining industry produced even fewer patents, despite growing in economic importance, its output 
expanding rapidly in volume and value.   As mines became deeper and seams were worked further 
and further underground, a host of new technical challenges had to be met.  Yet, the extraction of coal 
and ores scarcely featured in the patent records: only three patents were obtained for rock-boring tools 
or blasting techniques during the eighteenth century; only three for proposed solutions to the pressing 
problems of ventilation and ‗fire-damp‘ (explosions). The productivity of the mining industry was 
raised in large part by the incremental adjustments to techniques practised by miners and skilled 
managers.  Patentees were attracted instead to the solution of strictly mechanical problems in the 
mining industry—in particular, drainage and winding engines—that were visible on the surface, easily 
described, and represented a significant capital investment. A patent for such engines was both more 
easily policed and more marketable than the empirical improvements being devised underground 
(Flinn 1984: 74-128; MacLeod 1988: 100-2). 
Nonetheless, there is also evidence of extensive inventive activity in this mechanical sphere beyond 
the purview of the patent system.  Cornish mining engineers, resentful of Watt‘s extended patent for 
the separate condenser, turned their back on the patent system: Cornwall‘s share of English patents for 
steam-related inventions fell from approximately 10 per cent in the eighteenth century to less than one 
per cent in the period 1813-52 (Nuvolari 2004: 358).  Yet, this period witnessed Cornwall gain 
predominance in steam engineering. It started with Richard Trevithick and Arthur Woolf erecting 
high-pressure steam engines in Cornish tin and copper mines, where high coal prices made 
thermodynamic efficiency essential.  It persisted through the empirical discovery and dissemination of 
best-practice techniques, in particular via their publication in Lean’s Engine Reporter.  The ‗duty‘ of 
Cornwall‘s high-pressure engines nearly doubled in a quarter of a century. Nuvolari shows that the 
phenomenon of ‗collective invention‘, first identified by Allen (1983) in the Cleveland iron industry 
of north-eastern England between 1850 and 1875, also operated in the Cornish mining district. Firms 
shared pertinent technical information concerning variations in design and performance, and utilized 
this shared knowledge to improve their technology (overwhelmingly by incremental inventions). Both 
the complex, empirical nature of the technology and the diverse structure of the Cornish mining 
industry (adventurers usually held shares in several mines) favoured the collective pursuit of 
improvements in the aggregate average performance of pumping engines.  The publication of 
performance indicators allowed the best engineers (employed by the mines to erect and maintain their 
steam pumps) to demonstrate their capabilities, thereby enhancing their professional reputations and 
career prospects (Nuvolari 2004).   
 
Similar priorities informed the nascent civil engineering profession, responsible for the innovations in 
transport and communications that we commonly identify with the industrial revolution.  The  
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problem-solving activity that underpinned the engineering of bridges, tunnels, cuttings, embankments, 
etc, whether on roads, canals, or railways, is scarcely reflected in the patent records.  Civil engineers 
tended to share and publish their solutions (MacLeod 1988: 104-5).  Again, although not as systematic 
as the ‗collective invention‘ identified in Cornwall or Cleveland, a similar disregard for patents is also 
recognizable among other innovative groups in this period, such as London‘s clock and instrument 
makers (MacLeod 1988: 113-14; (McConnell 2007), the first generation of West Riding textile 
engineers (Cookson 1997: 8-9), and early developers of machine tools – though secrecy was probably 
as rife as sharing (MacLeod 1988: 105-6, 188).  Paulinyi (1986) regards machine tools as the crucial 
technology that, by producing ‗machines to make machines‘, opened the way for mass production: 
rarely patented, a stream of inventions to facilitate the cutting and shaping of metals emanated from 
the workshops of highly skilled craftsmen, most of whom remain anonymous and undervalued.  
 
4.2 COLLECTIVE INVENTION IN A WIDER CONTEXT 
In his original paper, Allen (1983: 21) suggested that ‗under the conditions prevailing during the 
nineteenth century [collective invention]…was probably the most important source of inventions‘.  
Allen‘s conjecture rests on the idea that, before the establishment of corporate R&D laboratories,  in 
many industries inventive activities were a by-product of investment processes. In these conditions, 
collective invention was likely to be a very effective method of identifying the most promising 
direction of improvements.  On the other hand, Mokyr (2008) argues that collective invention ought 
instead to be considered as a marginal phenomenon. ‗There are three reasonably well-documented 
cases of successful collective invention . . . [Allen (1983), MacLeod (1988, pp. 112-113, 188), 
Nuvolari (2004)]. Examples of such cases are not many, and they required rather special 
circumstances that were not common, and collective invention in its more extreme form, to judge 
from its short life-spans, was vulnerable and ephemeral.‘  
 
There are reasons to think that Mokyr‘s assessment may be premature. First, it would be wrong to 
assume that collective invention was just a British phenomenon. For example, in his account of the 
development of the high-pressure engine for the western steamboats in the United States during the 
early nineteenth century, Hunter emphasised the significance of various flows of incremental 
innovations (Hunter 1949: 121-80). Interestingly, Hunter suggests that the litigation of the patents 
taken by Robert Fulton and Oliver Evans (mirroring the conflict between Boulton and Watt and 
Cornish engineers) may account for the negative attitude of western mechanics towards patents 
(Hunter, 1949: 10, 124-6). Similarly, the steady accumulation of many minor changes and alterations 
to the design of the physical characteristics of the steaming produced improvements in carrying 
capacity, increases of speed, reduction of cargo collection times, etc. Their cumulative impact led to a 




13 McGaw‘s (1987) detailed study of paper-making in Berkshire (US) seems also to 
point to another American collective invention setting.  These cases represent a challenging research 
agenda.  Given Khan and Sokoloff‘s argument for the US patent system‘s critical role as the 
fundamental driver of innovation in nineteenth-century America, it would be particularly interesting 
to mount a systematic search for cases of collective invention in the United States.   
 
Other cases of collective invention have been identified elsewhere.  French researchers have 
documented systematic incentives to collective invention among guildsmen in the technologically 
dynamic silk industry of Lyon, which crushed its London competitors who relied on patents and 
secrecy (Cottereau 1997, Foray & Hilaire-Pérez 2006).  Davids (2009) argues that collective invention 
was also a common practice among millwrights in the Zaankstreet in the Netherlands, during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Zaankstreet, one of the cutting-edge industrial districts in 
Europe at that time, was the first place where wind power was adopted on a massive scale. Kyriazidou 
and Pesendorfer (1999) suggest that collective invention also characterized the Viennese bentwood 
furniture industry in the second half of the nineteenth century: it was highly successful, establishing 
Viennese chairs as a fashion item throughout Europe. Furthermore, Allen (2009: 68-74) argues that 
collective invention was not limited to industry but was also a feature of many fundamental 
improvements in agriculture that were introduced in England from the second half of the seventeenth 
century, in particular new crop rotations.  
 
In the second half of the nineteenth century, in industries characterized by oligopolistic structures, 
processes of collective invention could be implemented by means of patent pools and research 
associations (in these cases the knowledge was shared only among the participants to the patent pool 
or the research association). Note that in several cases, these patent pools were created after having 
experienced phases of slow innovation due to the existence of blocking patents. In the 1870s, 
American producers of Bessemer steel decided to share information on design of plants and 
performances through the Bessemer Association (a patent pool holding control of the essential patents 
in the production of Bessemer steel). The creation of this patent pool was stimulated by the 
unsatisfactory innovative performance of the industry under the ‗pure‘ patent system regime. In that 
phase, the control of essential patents by different ﬁrms had resulted in an almost indissoluble 
technological deadlock. Similar concerns over patent blockages led ﬁrms operating in the US railway 
sector to adopt the same expedient of semi-automatic cross-licences and knowledge sharing 
(Nuvolari, 2004: 360-1). Processes of knowledge sharing organized among firms in cartels could be a 
very effective tool through which backward countries could rapidly catch up with the frontier, as 
                                                 
13 ―The available evidence suggests that the increase of steamboat productivity (on inland rivers), 1815-1860, 
exceeded that of any other major transportation medium for a period of similar length in the nineteenth century‖ 
(Mak and Walton, 1972:623).    
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illustrated by the case of the German chemical industry described by Murmann (2003) and the 
Japanese cotton spinning industry described by Saxonhouse (1974) 
 
These cases imply that collective invention was probably not such a marginal phenomenon as Mokyr 
suggests. However, even if they prove to be exceptional, they should not be dismissed as ‗curious 
exceptions‘.  It is worth re-emphasising, that key technologies at the heart of industrialization, such as 
high-pressure steam engines, iron production techniques, steamboats, automatic looms, etc., were at 
times developed through processes of collective invention, and consequently outside the purview of 
the patent system. All these cases provide a clear demonstration that inventive activities could be very 
effectively organized without resorting to patent protection. There are, of course, interesting historical 
parallels between collective invention and contemporary instances of innovation processes based on 
knowledge sharing, such as open source software (Nuvolari 2005) and the user communities 
identified by von Hippel and his associates (von Hippel 2005).  Given the remarkable successes in 
terms of rates of innovation that seem to characterize these experiences, it is clearly important to 
reflect on possible policy measures that could encourage the emergence and consolidation of these 
knowledge-sharing communities in new technological domains (Shah 2005). 
5. THE PATENT CONTROVERSY 
Retrospectively, these examples of ‗collective invention‘ lend weight to Victorian calls for the 
abolition of the patent system, a campaign that was sparked by the Patent Amendment Act of 1852.  
The UK had been slow to put its system of royal privileges on a firm statutory footing and reduce the 
obstacles faced by would-be patentees.  Sixty years earlier, political revolutions in France and the 
USA had enshrined the inventor‘s entitlement to a patent in their respective constitutions, prompting a 
wave of modernizing legislation elsewhere in Europe during the next two decades (Galvez-Behar 
2008: 21-52; Khan 2005, 49-54). Subsequently, while the UK was still wrestling with its unreformed 
system, Europe-wide movements inspired by economic liberalism were already reacting against the 
strength of patents and demanding their abolition (Machlup and Penrose 1950). In 1851, eight of 33 
witnesses who testified before a parliamentary select committee on the patent system advocated its 
abolition. This small but very authoritative minority, which contained several engineers including 
Isambard Kingdom Brunel, persuaded the committee‘s chairman, Lord Granville, to dissent from the 
report‘s reformist recommendations. ‗The whole system‘, declared Granville, ‗was unadvisable to the 
public, disadvantageous to inventors, and wrong in principle‘ (MacLeod 2007: 250).   
Nonetheless, the 1852 act finally established a patent office, reduced the initial cost of a patent to £25 
for the entire United Kingdom (it introduced renewal fees of £50 after three years and £100 after 
another four), and authorized the publication of patent specifications (backdated to 1617).  It required 
specification and granted protection at the point of application, but also allowed provisional protection  
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subject to full specification within six months (increased to 10 months in 1883). Such facilitating 
measures, with no official examination to counter them, raised fears of ‗frivolous‘ inventions 
swamping the system and mendacious patentees harassing manufacturers. It is, however, improbable 
that they would have unleashed a vociferous abolitionist campaign had it not been for the clause that 
exempted colonial sugar-refiners from patent royalties and turned their disadvantaged British rivals 
into dogged free-traders determined to extirpate all patent systems (Coulter 1992).   
 
The abolitionists‘ arguments were overwhelmingly pragmatic: patents constituted a harmful restraint 
on trade, an unjust monopoly that increased prices, an irritant to manufacturers and a fatal lure that 
impoverished ingenious working men. However, they also contested the individualistic model of 
invention that tacitly underpinned patenting. Technological change, they argued, had its own 
momentum, progressing incrementally through the accumulation of many inventive steps; in evidence 
they pointed to instances of simultaneous invention. No one, therefore, either merited the reward of a 
patent, or needed the incentive of one to invent (MacLeod 1996; MacLeod 2007, 264-76).  It is, of 
course, an argument that has been rehearsed many times since, not least by Chicago School 
sociologists (McGee 1995).  In Victorian Britain, the controversy stimulated a concerted defence of 
inventive ‗genius‘ by the Inventors‘ Institute (founded in 1862), patent agents and other interested 
parties.  ‗Smilesean‘ literature and works of art that celebrated the role of inventors and engineers in 
Britain‘s rise to industrial eminence reached a mass audience and helped preserve the patent system 
(MacLeod 2007: 251-76).  
 
Despite two more parliamentary inquiries and almost annual bills, the Economist’s prediction in 1869 
that Britain would emulate the Netherlands‘ abolition of its patent system proved incorrect.  The 
Patents, Designs and Trademarks Act of 1883 which, among other reforms, introduced a severely 
reduced initial fee (£4) sealed the abolitionists‘ defeat.  Across Europe the anti-patent movement was 
fizzling out as the continent (under pressure from cheap US agricultural imports) retreated from free 
trade. It too saw its nemesis in 1883, with the conclusion of the Paris Convention, the first 
international agreement on patenting, which strengthened the patentee‘s hand by implementing a 
measure of cross-border co-operation. The Convention also helped to pressurize the Netherlands into 
returning to the fold in 1912 and Switzerland into enacting its first (limited) federal patent law in 1888 
(Penrose 1951: 15-16; Schiff 1971; Khan 2005: 289-93). Interestingly enough, according to Machlup 
1958, p. 5, see also Chang (2001, p. 291)), the widespread acceptance of some limitation to the 
monopoly power of patents by means of compulsory licence clauses at the Patent Congress held at 
Vienna‘s World Fair in 1873 played also a critical role in marking the shift of opinion against the 





6. PATENTS AND INDUSTRIALIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
There has been insufficient research to determine conclusively whether the absence of patent systems 
in Switzerland and the Netherlands was to their economic advantage or disadvantage.  Switzerland 
industrialized early, despite its difficult terrain and lack of mineral resources: it developed a 
mechanized cotton industry, with ancillary strengths in dyeing and hydraulic engineering, and a 
world-leading watch-making industry. Schiff (1971) suggests that Swiss industrialists took advantage 
of the absence of a domestic patent system to found important industries based on foreign inventions, 
such as textile machinery making (1801), synthetic dyeing (1859), and electricity generation (c.1880). 
Its highly successful chemical and pharmaceutical industries lobbied hard to exclude their products 
from the patent system until 1907, to the fury of their German competitors. Meanwhile, Swiss 
inventors were responsible for major inventions in these and other industries, and had a consistently 
high rate of patenting abroad. Khan (2005: 292), who tends to belittle Swiss industry before 1888 (as 
essentially cuckoo-clocks and chocolate) points to the immediate and substantial increase in the rate 
of Swiss patenting in the US from 1888 as evidence of increased ‗inventive activity . . . induced by 
patent protection.‘  On the other hand, it may simply have reflected an increasing propensity to patent 
abroad once patent protection became available in Switzerland. What seems certain is that 
Switzerland‘s economy was among the fastest growing in Europe both before and after it introduced 
its own patent system (Carreras and Josephson 2010). 
 
The Netherlands had enjoyed the highest incomes per head in Europe since the seventeenth century, 
based principally on their domination of international trade, a large proto-industrial sector and 
commercial agriculture. They were overtaken by the United Kingdom only in the mid 1840s and by 
Switzerland and Belgium in the late 1880s (Carreras and Josephson 2010). In the nineteenth century 
the Dutch seem to have largely ignored their own patent system, whether through lack of inventive 
activity or insouciance of patents.  Only 4,561 patents were issued from 1800 to 1869, and between 
1851 and 1865 88.6 per cent were obtained by foreigners (in 1912 foreigners again took 79.3 per cent 
of Dutch patents) (Khan 2005: 290).  Most economic historians consider Dutch industrialization to 
have occurred during its ‗patentless‘ period, on a broad front and at a moderate rate with a continuing 
heavy involvement in international transit trade. However there are significant examples of Dutch 
industrialists taking advantage of foreign inventions to found major industries, as illustrated by the 
cases of the margarine industry (1871) and incandescent light-bulb manufacture (1891); the latter 
enjoyed major benefits by not being subject to Edison‘s licences and it was the basis for the creation 
of the Philips electrical company (Schiff 1971; Van Zanden and Van Riel 2004: 301). 
 
On balance, the limited evidence that we have suggests that neither Switzerland nor the Netherlands 
suffered from the absence of their own patent system at a time when most other industrialized or  
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industrializing countries kept theirs.  If anything, for these two small open economies catching up 
with the world technological frontier not to have a patent system was probably a rational course of 
action, as long as it did not instigate major retaliations by the international community (Van Zanden 
and Van Riel 2004: 177-8). It may be wise, however, to note Khan‘s (2005: 294) conclusion that, ‗In 
any event, both the Netherlands and Switzerland featured unique circumstances that hold few lessons 
for developing countries today.‘
14 
 
7. THE UK PATENT SYSTEM, 1852-1907 
Khan and Sokoloff emphasise the high cost of British patents in comparison with the US, and 
demonstrate that the rate of patenting per head of US population jumped during the early nineteenth 
century as the social composition of patentees broadened.  They conclude that ‗the operation of the 
patent system in England discouraged many inventors or would-be inventors from participation in the 
system‘ (Khan & Sokoloff 1998: 305; MacLeod 1991).  Undoubtedly, the two reductions in initial 
fees made the UK system more widely accessible.   The first in 1852 saw the total number of patents 
issued leap from 455 in 1851 to 2,113 in 1853, and then rise to nearly 4,000 per annum by the early 
1880s; following the second in 1883, it shot to 9,308 in 1885, reaching 14,000 per annum in the late 
1890s (Boehm and Silberston 1967: 22-3, 32-4; Khan and Sokoloff 1998: 299). Yet, many inventors 
still disregarded the patent system, finding other, more appropriate means for exploiting their 
invention, including secrecy (Moser 2005). 
Demands for reform continued, largely because of the high renewal fees introduced in 1852 and 
problems created by the continuing lack of official examination. Indeed, the two issues were closely 
related. Examination was repeatedly rejected in the belief that high costs provided an efficient filter of 
‗frivolous‘ and poor quality inventions without the need for a new bureaucracy (Dutton 1984: 45). 
Examination was considered to be not only expensive and impractical (in particular, through a 
shortage of technically trained personnel) but also potentially unjust (Soul 1869: 6-7).   There is 
evidence, however, that high costs were a very poor substitute: both before and after 1852, they failed 
as an efficient gatekeeper while continuing to exclude many inventors from access to patent 
protection. 
                                                 
14 We should also bear in mind, that another option available for catching-up countries for tapping freely into the world technological 
frontier was the implementation of a patent system that, in actual practice, discriminated against foreign patent owners, allowing them a 
reduced degree of protection against domestic imitators. See Richter and Streb (2009) for an insightful case study of the catching up 
activities of German machine tool manufacturers.  Even when we look at the case of the US patent system that, according to Khan and 
Sokoloff (Khan and Sokoloff, 1998: Khan 2005), played a critical role in triggering the economic ascendancy of the United States during the 
nineteenth century, we should consider that the early history of the systems was characterized by a significant number of discriminatory 
practices against foreign inventors. In particular, foreign inventors until 1836 were not allowed to take patents in the US (Khan, 2010).  In 
this way, it was possible for American inventors to transfer technologies from abroad by patenting small modifications of foreign inventions. 




Under the 1852 act, to keep a UK patent in force for the full fourteen years cost £175; previously a 
patent for England and Wales (as the majority had been) cost approximately £110. ‗By 1870, the cost 
in US dollars of securing patents [in the UK], calculated on the basis of price per annum covered, was 
considerably higher than elsewhere, by a factor of three compared to Belgium and France, often 
compared to Prussia, and of thirty compared to the United States‘ (Inkster 2000: 135).  The 1883 act 
lowered the initial fees and extended the first period by a year: £4 now bought four years‘ protection, 
£54 seven years‘, and £154 fourteen. In 1884, the government bowed to pressure, allowing renewal 
fees to be paid in instalments: £10 per annum before the end of years four to seven: £15 per annum at 
eight and nine; £20 at ten to thirteen. In 1892, it introduced a sliding scale that started at £5 after four 
years and rose, by annual increments of £1, to £14 after thirteen – a structure that continued through 
the twentieth century.  This represented a reduction of total renewal fees from £150 to £95, still higher 
than campaigners had demanded (and in real terms approximately 12 times more expensive than in 
1965), but it was official recognition that the dilemma posed by two large, lump-sum payments after 
four and seven years had been dysfunctional (MacLeod et al. 2003: 538, 547).  
A limited examination was introduced by the 1883 act, to check that the specification claimed no 
more than a single invention and prima facie it was properly described (Hewish 2000: 104-14). 
However, it was only when the Patents Act of 1902 required an (advisory) examination for prior art 
(in the previous 50 years‘ UK patent records) that the UK system ceased to be one of registration: 
until this came into force in 1905, the burden of scrutiny had lain with the patentee and his or her 
agent. The Patents and Designs Act of 1907 extended the scope of examination to exclude ‗frivolous‘ 
patents that were ‗contrary to natural laws‘, and authorized the examiners to refuse a patent for lack of 
novelty (Van Dulken 2000: 5).   
In the absence of examination, many patentees seem to have taken the risk of making no search for 
prior art.  The Fry Committee‘s scrutiny of 900 specifications in 1901 revealed that 42 per cent had 
been wholly or partly anticipated (in one case 13 times).  Apparently the situation had deteriorated 
since 1864, when the Royal Commission found 25 per cent of recent patents in this category 
(MacLeod et al. 2003: 541-2).  
Such patentees were unlikely to be among the 30 per cent of those with a sealed patent who paid the 
first renewal fee or the 11 per cent who paid the second (MacLeod et al. 2003: 538, n. 8).  Their 
purpose in obtaining a patent may have been primarily defensive: seeking some security against being 
harassed for royalties by another patentee, or some cheap kudos when advertising their business. It is 
even harder to explain the enormous increase in provisional (temporary) patents, which from 1852 
kept pace with the growth in sealed patents, except by reference to these heterodox reasons.  In the 
UK‘s system of registration, where very few applications were rejected, the lapsing of a provisional 
patent normally represented the failure to enter a full specification.  Before 1852, approximately 5.4  
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per cent of patents lapsed because of this (Van Dulken 1999: 31; MacLeod 1988: 48-53). Between 
1853 and 1883, 35 per cent of applications obtained no more than provisional protection, rising to 53 
percent between 1884 and 1899 (Boehm and Silberston 1967: 33-4). Again this decision seems to be 
price sensitive: under the 1852 act, while £5 secured a provisional patent (for six months), another 
£20 was needed to seal it; under the 1883 act, the figures fell to £1 (for ten months) and £3. The fall 
from £5 to £1 seems to have had greater impact on behaviour than that from £20 to £3 (MacLeod et 
al. 2003: 556-60).  Three pounds was still more than a week‘s wages for most working men. 
Contemporary critics of high renewal fees complained that they represented an insuperable barrier to 
many patentees with technically valuable inventions (MacLeod et al. 2003: 544-6). Yet, as some also 
suspected, they failed to weed out many valueless inventions that included perpetual motion 
machines.  In 1851, the engineer Richard Roberts criticised the unreformed patent system for 
harbouring ‗a great number of very silly things, which no man who had been long in a workshop 
would ever think of patenting; and the reason is, that the patentee has money, though deficient in 
experience and mechanical talent‘ ([House of Lords] 1851: 422-3).  Such patentees might be excused 
on the grounds that these high fees all had to be paid at the start. It is more surprising that, after 1852, 
some wasted their money on renewal fees in the light of three or four (or even seven) years‘ 
experience. Recent research on steam-engine patents, which employed an engineer to assess the 
technical viability of abridged specifications, found that in a sample of 56 patents (fully or 
provisionally specified) obtained in 1855 that he deemed technically unviable, nine were renewed 
after three years, including two that were also definitely renewed after seven (a third could not be 
traced). The rate of renewal for these patents, renewed at least once (17 per cent), was not much 
below that for apparently viable stationary and marine steam engines (25 per cent) (Andrew et al. 
2001; MacLeod et al. 2003: 549-54).     
 8. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Evidently the patent system had close links with industrialization, but these were not ones of simple 
cause and effect as implied by North.  A patent was a form of property and an instrument of 
competition that was growing in value in an increasingly capitalistic, manufacturing economy.  We 
might even reverse the causal arrow: industrialization promoted the patent system.  
The specific characteristics of Britain‘s patent system were moulded by the circumstances of its 
development: an oligarchic society produced an oligarchic patent system.  Its social bias was 
sufficiently marked to prompt the head of the judiciary Lord Chancellor Kenyon, while finding in 
favour of Boulton and Watt in 1799, to confess to some disquiet: ‗it struck him that there was a great 




15  Most eighteenth-century inventors were either ignorant of its existence, or 
found it too expensive or inconvenient to buy and enforce a patent. In fact, other very effective 
strategies of appropriation (such as secrecy or a head start in the production or the use of the 
invention) were open to inventors (MacLeod, 1992).    Many could see no benefit from patenting their 
invention in the particular circumstances in which they intended to use it: they proceeded to deploy it 
unobtrusively in their own business, or engaged in collective invention.  Some retained ethical 
misgivings about appropriating an invention for personal gain, and others still perceived technical 
change as a phenomenon subject to divine intervention or ‗Providence‘, for which no individual 
merited reward (MacLeod 1988: 202-4, 219-20).  Possibly, only a minority calculated that a patent 
would be a good commercial investment, or that it would be perilous not to obtain one because of the 
risk of pre-emption.   
The conditions for a market in invention were only in their infancy in eighteenth-century Britain, and 
the patent system was developed by commercially minded men in order to promote it . This period 
witnessed market-orientated inventors and investors suffering many frustrations and set-backs as they 
attempted to educate the government and the judiciary in the role they conceived a patent system 
should play (Dutton 1984: 37, 42-5; Robinson 1971).   With a patent system more in the mould of its 
more democratic US counterpart, we may speculate that Britain might have enjoyed not only a faster 
rate of economic growth (through higher rates of invention and its diffusion), but also a greater degree 
of social mobility, thanks to widened opportunities for the commercialization of inventions (Khan and 
Sokoloff 1998: 306). However, it would have required a different type of society to produce such a 
patent system.  On the other hand, those historians as Khan and Sokoloff that highlight the beneficial 
role of the more ―modern‖ US patent system on innovative performance throughout the nineteenth 
century should also take better into account in their assessments that Britain, with her very imperfect 
patent system was the first industrial nation and at least until the 1850 (if not the 1870s) was the world 
technological leader (Mokyr, 2002, p. 295)   
With no patent system, investment capital to develop and commercialize the more capital-intensive 
inventions might have been harder to find.  Increasing levels of capital investment in manufacturing 
industry raised the financial stakes for entrepreneurs (Pollard 1964, Chapman 1970, Feinstein 1978, 
Cottrell 1980, Crafts 1985: 71-7).  Fixed assets in the relatively novel form of buildings and 
machinery, while opening the way to unprecedented levels of production and profit, also exposed 
them to new risks: to losses from fire or interruptions of trade or strikes.  The insurance industry was 
developed to offer some security against such risks as fire; the legislature was mobilized to curtail the 
power of workers and to deter crimes against property (Supple 1980, Rule 1986, Pearson 2004). 
Analogously, in the patent system such manufacturers saw an institution that would allow them to 
                                                 
15 Quoted from The Times Law Report, 26 January 1799.  
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manage their investment in new technology—to secure their ‗property‘, and to exclude unauthorised 
intruders (Greasley and Oxley 2007).  ‗Few capitalists would invest in invention without the 
protection of a patent.  Inventing was a risky activity and this kind of protection was the only realistic 
way of appropriating a return sufficient to cover the cost of producing and developing inventive 
output‘ (Dutton 1984: 151).  It was primarily their interests that shaped the patent system in the two 
centuries before 1852 and arguably beyond. Furthermore, besides the incentive effect that the patent 
system may have played, one should also consider in the assessment that in several cases patents 
probably stifled the rate of innovation by discouraging follow-up innovations. The most poignant case 
in this respect is that of James Watt‘s patent for the separate condenser (Torrens, 1982).     
Still, notwithstanding all these considerations, we contend that, given the evidence of widespread 
inventive activity outside the coverage of patent protection, even with no patent system, British 
inventors would have continued to invent.  Perhaps the industrial revolution would not have happened 
exactly as it did, but the wider and deeper pressures towards industrialization throughout the western 
hemisphere at this period imply that it would have occurred in some form, more or less at the same 
time, and most probably in Britain (Allen 2009).  
The implications of our analysis for contemporary debates on patent systems are straightforward. The 
patent system seems to have had, at best, ‗second order‘ effects on the course of industrial 
development in Britain.  Given the most recent trends towards the extension (e.g., to new life forms, 
business methods, software programs) and the deepening (i.e. measures for ensuring stronger 
enforcement) of patent systems, which seem to have highly ambiguous effects on both rates of 
innovation and social welfare at large (Bessen and Maurer 2008, Boldrin and Levine, 2008 ), one 
cannot avoid the impression that excessive emphasis has been put on the implementation of ‗strong‘  
intellectual property rights regimes and that a more sober and pragmatic approach to patent reform is 
in order.  
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